Recent American Decisions by Editors,
TOLL-BRIIGE CO. V. OSBORN.
Supreme Court of _Errors of Comecticut.
THE COMPANY FOR ERECTINGAND SUPPORT1NGATOLL-BRIDG
FROM NEW HAVEN TO EAST HAVEN V8. WALTER OSBORE.'
It is the general policy of the law to avoid double taxation, and this considera-
tion Is of weight in determining the construction of statutes imposing it; but
where their meaning is clear the courts cannot hold such taxation illegal-
A corporation was chartered in 1796 to build and maintain a toll-bridge, with
power, "for the purpose of carrying the resolve into effect," to purchase and
hold lands not exceeding one hundred acres. The company built the bridge,
and soon after purchased a large quantity of mud flats, adjoining the bridge.
and erected wharves upon a portion of it, which became of great value, and
were profitably rented. An act passed in 1847 provided that the real estate
of any private corporation, "above what was required and used for the
transaction of Its appropriate business." should be liable to be assessed and
taxed to the same extent as if owned by an individual. Held. that the real
estate thus used by the company for wharves was liable to taxation under
the statute.
Such a use of the recl estate which the company was authoriz . to purchase
and hold was not contemplated or authorized by its charter.
And the question as to what rights the company might have acquired by sub-
scription did not properly arise, inasmuch as the charter, on which the com-
pany itself relied, showed clearly what was its appropriate business, andtbis
was the sole question in determining the liability of the property to taxa-
tion.
The charter provided that the bridge, and all property owned by the company
appurtenant thereto, should be considered personal estate and divided into
shares. Held, that this provision related to the property of the atockholders
as represented by the shares, and not tothe propertyof the corporation itself
in its relation to other parties, and that the property in question was there-
fore taxable as real estate.
ASSUMPSIT, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven
county against the defendant, as tax collector, to recover the
amount of certain taxes collected of the plaintiffs upon war-
rants held by him. The facts, which were found by an
auditor, were as follows:
The plaintiffs are a corporation under a charter granted in
1796, authorizing the company to build a bridge and collect
tolls for the period of seventy years (subsequently extended to
I We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of Mr. Hooker, the reporter.-
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one hundred and fifty), and for that purpose to purchase and
hold lands not exceeding one hundred acres.
Under this authority the company had purchased, in 1797
and 1816, a large quantity of mud flats, adjoining the abut-
ments of the bridge, which had subsequently been filled in and
covered with wharves, from the rent of which a large part of
the company's income was derived.
By an Act of 1847 (Gen. Statutes, p. 712, see. 23), "the real
estate belonging to any bank, national banking association,
insurance company, or other private corporation, over and
above what may be required and used by such bank, insurance
company, or other private corporation, for the transaction of its
appropriate business, shall be liable to be assessed and set in the
list of such corporation in the town where such real estate is
situated, and shall be liable to taxation to the same extent as
if owned by an individual." a
Under this act atax was laid by the assessors of New Haven,
in 1865, upon all the property not actually used in connection
with the bridge, and collected by the defendant. This was an
action "to recover back the amount so levied and collected.
On these facts the case was reserved for the advice of this
court.
Watrous, for the plaintiffs.
1. These wharves are already taxed three times. It is against
the policy of our law to tax any property twice, much more to
tax itfour times, and courts of justice will not allow such unjust
taxation, unless clearly compelled so to do by the sovereign
power of the legislature. New Haven y. City Bank, 31 Conn.
114; Ang. & Ames on Corp., §§ 460, 461.
2. Building and using these wharves is a part of the "appro-
priate business" of the plaintiffs. 1st. They are by their charter
expressly authorized" to purchase and hold lands not exceeding
one hundred acres, appurtenant to said bridge, for the purpose
of carrying this resolve into effect." The resolve gives the
power to build and imposes the duty to keep in repair a bridge.
These appurtenant lands were of no value till filled in and
improved by the plaintiffs. How, then, were they to aid the
purpose of the resolve? The legislature must, therefore,
TOLL-BRIDGE CO. V. OSBlORN.
have contemplated the improvement and use of these lands
by the company. And what use, if not ths most natural, fea-
sible and practical use? 2d. The legislature empowered the
plaintiffs to occupy, for their corporate business, lands on which,
for more than fifty years, a ferry and wharves had been main-
tained when the charter was granted. It could not have con-
teniplated the abandonment of those wharves, when it autho-
rized the building of a bridge in place of the ferry, and the
purchase of a hundred acres of land appurtenant to the bridge.
3d. If it can be supposed that the legislature did not have
in view this particular "use" of these lands, still the law
would infer that they could be put to a reasonable, ap.propriate
and profitable use. The powers and rights expressly granted
would fail without such an implication: 2 Redf. on Railways,
sec. 231; Pierce on Railways, 9, 14, 54; New Haven v. City
Bank, 31 Conn. 110. See also Moss v. Averell, 10 New York
449, 454; Schenectady and Syracuse Plan7 Boad Company v.
Thatcher, 11 id. 102; Durfee v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 5 Allen
530.
3. The charter has, by immemorial usage, received a con-
struction which neither the state nor any citizen of it 6ught
to be at liberty to dispute: Mayor of Hull v. Horner, (Cowp.
102; Withnell v. Gartham, 6 T. R. 388, 398 ; Davidsern v.
Fowler, 1 Root, 358; Eiscopal Church v. Newbern Academy,
2 Hawks 233; 2 :Redfield on Railways, see. 233 c, § 3.
4. The plaintiffs have byprescription a right to maintain and
use these wharves. 1st. The creation of a corporation by act
of the sovereign power will be presumed after the lapse of much
less time than the plaintiffs have owned and used these wharves:
Johnson v. Ireland, 11 East 280; Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R.
158; Aug. & Ames on Corp. § 70; 1 Redfield on Railways,
sec. 17 a; Green v. Chelsea, 24 Pick. 71; Avery v. Stewart, 1
Cush., 496; Shrewsbury v. Brown, 25 Verm., 197; Thorpe v.
Rutland and Burlington R. R. Co., 27 id. 140; Hart v.
Culker, 5 Conn. 311, 315. 2d. Prescription runs in favor of
a corporation in the same way as in favor of an individual:
cases above cited; also Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 292, 296,
302. 3d. Afortiori will the grant of a particular corporate
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function or franchise be presumed from lapse of time. H.Afiy
of Hull v. Homer, Cowp. 102; Bank of United States v. Dan
dridge, 12 Wheat. 70. 4th. The right to build and use a
wharf as a "franchise," and a grant of the same will be per.
sumed: 2 Washburn Real Prop. 78; Gray v. Bartlett, 20
Pick. 186; Tiswall v. Hall, 3 Paige 313, 318. 5h. If the
building and using of these wharves is not the "appropriate
business" of the plaintiffs, then they are acts ultra vires, and
the plaintiffs are, and for seventy years have been mere usurp-
ers, and Quo Warranto would lie for the usurpation: Aug. &
Ames on Corp. § 737. But such a proposition would be simply
absurd: Aug. & Ames on Corp. § 743; Winchelsea Causes, 4
Burr. 1962.
5. These wharves are personal estate. The charter provides
that "said bridge and all property appurtenant thereto, and
vested in and belonging to said company, shall be considered
and is declared to be personal estate." Not the 11 stock," as in
many charters since 1797, but the property is declared to be
"personal estate."
C. R., Ingersoll for defendant.
Opinion of the court by
BHiNA.M , C. J.-The question is whether the property as.
sessed was liable to taxation under the plaintiffs' charter, as
real estate, under the 23d section of the statute passed in 1847,
relating to the assessment of taxes, Gen. Statutes, page 712.
The first two claims of the plaintiffs are so nearly identical,
that they may properly be considered together. They are in
substance, that the tax in this case is grossly inequitable and
unjust, because if sustained it amounts to double taxation; or,
as is claimed in this case to be the fact, the property under the
statutes as construed by the defendant, is taxed three or four
times. This is said to be so, because the market value of the
stock of the plaintiffs is to a great extent dependent upon the
value of these wharves; and as the bulk of the stock is owned
by the Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company, the value
of the wharves enhances the value of the company's stock; and
a a State tax is laid upon the value of this railroad stock,
and as the stock is also taxed as the private property of its
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individual owners, it is therefore burdenedwith some three or
four distinct and separate taxes. We have not deemed it im-
portantto enquire into the fact as to whether this property is
subjected in some form to other taxation than such as is im-
posed by the statute under which the taxes in question were
collected, because, as remarked by ELLSWORTH, J., in the case
of the Saving8 Bank v. The Toum of New London, 20 Conn.
117, "taxation at best is unequal and arbitrary, and under the
present law is double in the case of banks, whose real estate
(not used for a banking house) is taxed, while their stock is
taxed to individuals who own it." And it may be added that
the instances in which property is taxed more than once, are
not very infrequent. Formerly it was.the case in respect to
that large amount of indebtedness secured by mortgage, where
the debt was liable to taxation against the creditor, and the
property by which the debt was secured was also taxed against
the mortgager. No doubt it is and ought to be the general
policy of the legislature to avoid double taxation of the same
property. But there is also as little doubt that this genera]
policy is not always carried out. And while it may be true
that in a case of doubtful construction as to the meaning of the
legislature, this policy might be sufficient to authorize the
court to give a construction to a statute that would avoid this
result, still, in cases where the language is clear, the fact that
it imposes double taxation will never justify a court in disre.
garding it.
Again, it is claimed that the legislature granted to the plain-
tiffs, by their charter, power to purchase a large quantity of
land, in pursuance of which the plaintiffs did purchase a strip
of mud flats on each side of the river, much larger than was
necessary for the mere purposes of .the bridge; that it must
have been purchased for the purpose of constructing wharves
upon it; that the plaintiffs very soon commenced constructing
wharves upon these flats; that the legislature has since re-
peatedly had the charter of the company under consideration,
and has made alterations in it, yet in no instancewas the known
use the plaintiffs were making of the property complained of;
and it is claimed that thus a construction has been put upon
"77
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the charter which cannot now be disputed, or at least that the
Tight has been acquired to so use this property; and that it
thus becomes a part othe appropriate business of the company
to own and rent wharves, and that so, under the language of the
atute, the property can only be taxed as a part of the capital
'of the company. We'do not assent to this proposition. On
the contrary, we think the only appropriate business of the
p-laintiffs was the erection and -maintenance of a toll-bridge.
As incident to this business, they would need land on which to
treat its structure with its abutments and piers, and large
quantities of dirt and gravel would also be required for the
purposes of grading and filling in, and in view of this necessity
the company was authorized to purchase and hold-not exceed-
ing one hundred acres of land. But the legislature never
intended that the authority to purchase and hold lands should
'be made use of as an authority to build and rent wharves, any
;fn6re than it intended to authorize the building and renting of
etOres or houses, or the business of farming, whatever might
have been thb object of the applicants themselves in procuring
the charter with these provisions to be granted. And where
there are no words in the grant, as we think there are none in
this company's charter, to justify the building of wharves for
the mere purpose of deriving an income from the renting of
thet, the long continued practice of the company in pursuing
the -business cannot authorize us to -imply such a power.
Again, it is claimed that the plaintiffs have by prescription
acquired the right to maintain and use the wharves and docks
in question. The question in this case is not as to whether
such a corporation of the plaintiffs exists. Here the existence
of the corporation is claimed by the plaintiffs, and not denied
by the defendant. The charter of the company is shown and
relied upon as evidence as the power to hold and maintain
these wharves as a part of the appropriate business of the
company under it. There is, therefore, no room for prescrip-
tion as to what is the appropriate business of the company, as
it affects the right of the public to tax its property. That
must depend upon the charter. The plaintiffs show their grant
and profess to be acting under it, and at the same time are
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claiming power to do *acts which are not authorized by it.
These claims are repugnant to each other, apd cannot be
sustained.
The remaining claim of the plaintiffs is, that these wharves
and docks are personal property, because, as is claimed, the
charter makes them so. The charter provides that the "bridgo
and all property appurtenant thereto, and vested in and belong.
ing to said company, shall be considered, and is hereby declared
to be personal estate." But the town of New Haven has not
attempted to tax the plaintiffs' bridge, and it claims that the
property which it has taxed, is in no sense appurtenant to it,
and, therefore, not within the language of the clause of the
charter. Of course the property must, under the statute under
Which the tax was laid, be "real estate over and above what
was required and used" in the appropriate business of the cor-
poration. And if such is the fact in regard to this property,
then it is difficult to see how it can be any part of the bridge,
,or be appurtenant to it. The property itself, therefore, does
not come within that provision of the charter, making certain
of its prnperty personal estate, unless it is appurtenant to the
bridge structure itself, and this is hardly claimed to be the
case in respect to that portion of it that is found to be at a
distance of five hundred feet from the structure. And if any
part of the whamves and docks can properly be said to be appur-
tenant to the bridge, it can, we think, only be so said in respect
to the two small wharves with which the bridge was provided
when first erected. And how it might be in regard to these,
we have no occasion to determine at this time, as we are not
aware that they are included in or constitute a part of the
property on which the tax was laid, and the plaintiffs make no
separate or distinct claim in respect to them.
Again, we do not think that the provision i" the plaintiff '
charter, in respect to the bridge and the propert) .ppurtenant
to it, declaring that it shall be considered to be pen: nal estate,
was intended to change the character of the estate, 'o as to
make the real estate that the company purchased under its
power to do so, personal estate the moment the company
became its owners. At the time the charter was granted, it
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was probably supposed that the shares in such a corporation
might b considered real estate, unless some provision of this
sort was inserted in the charter, as 'was afterward held to be
the case in respect to the shares in a turnpike company in the
case of Wells v. Cowles, 2 Conn. 567; and to guard against
this result this provision was, we have no doubt, inserted in
the charter. We assent, therefore, to the claim of the defend-
ant's counsel upon this point, that the property that by the
charter was declared to be personal estate, was simply that
which was to be divided into and represented by shares of
stock. The object was to facilitate the transaction of the busi-
ness of the corporation, and enable the stock to be transferred
by the individual holders of it, without the inconvenient for-
mality of making deeds of it as if it were real estate; as
remarked by Chancellor WALWORTH, in The Mohawk & Hudson
Railroad Co. v. Clute, 4 Paige 393, in speaking of a provision
declaring the stock of a company personal property, "it merely
relates to the nature or character of the property which the
stockholders are to be deemed to have in the several shares of
the stock of the company as individuals, and not to the char-
acter of the property held by the company in its corporate
capacity for the benefit of such stockholders." We cannot think,
therefore, that the legislature by one clause of this charter,
intended to authorize this company to purcbase and to hold
real estate not exceeding one hundred acres, and intended at
the same time by anotner clause, to turn this real estate into
personal property as between the company itself and third
persons. Butjby the construction which we give to the charter
there is no conflict whatever between these two provisions.
Upon the whole case, therefore, we have come to the conclu-
sion that the wharves and docks were and are real estate, not.
used by the plaintiffs in the appropriate business which the
charter authorized; and that they were therefore liable to taxa-
tion by the town and city of New Haven. We therefore advise
the superior court that the defendant is entitled to judgment
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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The foregoing case Is one of conside. But there can be no possible legal
rable practical Interest both to tax- objection to this double taxation, since
payers and the profession, although the one is imposed upon the corpora.
hot one which at the present day can tion, which is in law and in fact as
fairly be regarded as involving a ques- distinct in its personality and exist-
tion of any serious doubt. enoe from the corporation, as any one
The greatest possible confusion naturalperson Is distinct from another.
would result if we should attempt to And *hen the corporation, In addi.
fix any plan whereby no property tion to their ordinary capital stock,
should be subjected to more than own property, real or personal, which
one taxation. And yet this seems Is not embraced In or represented by
to be the ideal of the general public the capital stock, there is no reason
on that subject. All income taxes why it may not also be subjected to a
violate this dogma many times over, separat taxation. This is the ordi.
in every State and district where they nary case of banking corporations,
are carried out. The same is true of owning or holding a banking house,
almost all taxes not imposed upon forming no portion of the capital
specific property. But it seems high tock.
time to ignore any such pretension in
regard to taxation, when we are all
taxed to the utmostlimlt of endurance,
without the slightest regard to the
singleness or oneness of the imposition.
But in regard to the taxation of
corporations, there are so many modes
of imposing it, both upon the company
and the shareholder, that there is un-
questionably great danger of abuse,
within strictly legal limits. In the
first place, the corporhtiop Is liable to
taxation upon all its capital stock or
property owned by the corporation,
and at the same time owners of the
shares maybeand commonly are taxed
upon them, thus, in effect, taxing the
same property twice to the same per.
sons, once in bulk and once in shares
And there are many instances where
corporations have been taxed specifi.
cally for separate property, as the
road-bed and superstructure of a rail.
way, which was embodied in the
capital stock, for which a separate tax
was also paid; and we are not aware
that any legal impediment exists to
one form of the taxation on account of
the imposition of the other. We have
discussed these questions somewhat in
The Supplement to the Law of Ral-
ways, pp. 493-616, ;here the cases Are
referred to. They will be found very
carefully collected in the briefs In the
present case. See also 2 Redf. BaUw.,
pp. 877-88; 389-0; and numerous cases
oited.
Vo. XVIL--.
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82 MYERS v. KNICKERBOCKER LIFE INS. Co.
Court of Common Peas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
JACOB MYERS et al., V. KNICKERBOCKER LIFE INSURANCE CO.
A General Agency for a-Life Insurance Company Is like any other agency,
revocaole at the will of either party, subject to the claim of the other party for
such damages as the contract may entitle him to.
Where the contract of appointment does not give the agent an ezcusve right
to represent the company, the lattermay appoint other agentsbutthe appoint-
meut of another agent in the same place, whose operations materially lessen
the advantages of the contract to the first agent, is a breach of the contract by
the company, and the agent may terminate it, or have an action for damages.
The abandonment by the agent of a substantial part of his principals busi.
ness, Is a good ground of terminating his agency, but if the principal assents to
such abandonment, the authority of the agent as to the rest of the business
continues.
An insurance agent, by his contract, was to solicit new insurances, and to
collect premiums on renewals of former ones. On the new ones, and on the
renewals so long as they should be collected by him, and paid to the company
without other expense to it, he was to have certain specified commissions.
H ed, that his abandonment of soliciting new Insurances wouldbe good ground
for the company to terminatehis agency forboth purposes; but if the company
failed tW discharge him for such cause, and he continued with its assentto collect
the renewal premiums, then his right to commissions thereon continued; and if
the company subsequently refused, without other good cause, to allow him to
collect renewals, he would be entitled to damages.
This was an action for breach of contract, in depriving plain-
tiffs of the collection of certain renewal premiums on insur-
ances which they had obtained as agents for defendants, under
the following letter of appointment:
Messrs. JAcoB & JAmEs H. MyEas, Galion, 0. :
GzNTrmr :--The directors of this company are pleased to appoint you
their general agents to obtain insurance for them in the State of Ohio. For
your services as such general agents the company will allow you the follow-
ing commissions: On all first premiums collected by you, seventeen per cent.
besides the policy fee; on the renewals of your business, seven per cent., so
long as they are collected by you and paid to the company without other and
further expense to them. And after the death of Jacob Myers, the renewals to
be collected by James H. Myers, and the same commissions to be paid to him
so long as they are collected without further charge to the company.
You will please observe, in particular, the instructions addressed to you on
the third page opposite.
I am, yours truly,
llR&5TUS LY.A. President.
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The other facts sufficiently appear in the charge of the court.
E. Sowers and W. H. Gaylord, for plaintiffs.
W. . McFarland and Geo. Willey, for defendant.
Pmurss, J., charged the jury, as follows:
This action, gentlemen, is brought to recover for the value
of what are called renewals of certain insurances, effected by
the plaintiffs, in the company of the defendant, or rather the
ulaintifs' commissions on such renewals. The plaintiffs' claim
is predicated upon a contract made between them and the
defendant, by which the plaintiffs were appointed general agents
of the defendant "to obtain " insurance for the defendant "in
the State of Ohio."
The plaintiffs state in their petition, the contract, by the
terms of which they were to receive as compensation for their
services, as such general agents of the defendant, on all first
premiums collected by them, seventeen per cent., and on all
renewal premiums seven per cent., so long as they were col-
lected by the plaintiffs, or paid to defendant without other and
further expense to the defendant than plaintiffs' commissions.
These commissions were subsequently increased by the defend-
ant to twenty per cent. on the first premiums, and to ten per
eent. on the renewal premiums. They farther state that accom-
panying the letter of appointment were certain instructions as
to the manner in which the duties of the plaintiffs were to be
performed, and which constituted a part of the terms and con-
ditions of the contract. They state that they accepted this
appointment and entered upon and faithfully discharged the
duties of their agency until on or about the first of July, 1867,
at which time the defendant, without good cause, refused to
allow them to collect, and forbade their collecting the renewals
on insurances t!iey had procured for defendant, though they
were at all times ready and willing to collect them. They
state that in the discharge of their duties they procured three
hundred and thirty-eight policies of insurance in the company
of the defendant; that the amount insured by these policies
was three hundred and seventy th6usand dollars, and the
annual renewal premiums on these policies were thirty-seven
thousand dollars, and claim that by reason of the defendant's
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refusal to allow them to collect, and forbidding their collection
of the renewal premiums, they have sustained damages to the
amount of thirteen thousand dollars, for which, with interest
upon that sum from the first of July, 1867, they ask judg-
ment against the defendant.
The defendant, in its answer, admits the appointment of the
plaintiffs as general agents of the defendant, and their accept.
ance of that appointment, and at the clos4 of the answer the
defendant denies everything stated in the petition which is not
previously admitted in the answer; in substance, the answer
denies all other'allegations and statements of the petitioners.
The answer further states that the agency of the plaintiffs was
terminated with the plaintiffs with their consent, given in their
letter of September 18th, 1867, for certain reasons which are
set forth in the answer. And these reasons for the termina.
tion of the plaintiffs' agency stated in the answer are:
1st. That the plaintiffs employed, as medical examiners,
persons whom they knew had no proper amount of medical
knowledge and skill to fit them for the performance of the
duties of medical examiners.
2d. That the plaintiffs refused and neglected to make re-
turns of their transactions as general agents of the defendant,
as they were required to do by the 8th article of the instruc-
tions appended to the letter of appointment.
3d. That the plaintiffs refused and neglected to remit moneys
collected by them to the defendant.
4th. That the plaintiffs refused to account for the number
and amount of policies and renewal certificates in their hands,
and return to the defendant.
5th. That the plaintiffs allowed bills of account against the
defendant, not specially authorized by the defendant in
writing, and returned and paid such bills out of defendant's
money in their hands, and neglected to send defendant vouchers
for money expended by them, either with or without the
authority of the defendant.
6th. That while the plaintiffs were acting as the defendant's
general agents, they wrote the defendant certain insulting and
disagreeable letters, and letters threatening to work for othei
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insurance companies, and took the agency of the Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Company, and procured insurance fur
that company, and endeavored to persuade and did persuade
persons who were insured in defendant's company to change
their insurances into the Connecticut Mutual.
7th. That the plaintiffs' reports to defendant were irregular
as to form and time, incomplete, incorrect, and at times entirely
unintelligible; that they kept their accounts with the defend-
ant, and with policy-holders, in so incorrect and unintelligible
a manner, that they could not be understood or explained.
8th. That the plaintiffs received frpm the defendant a large
number of policies and notes, a list of which is appended to
the answer, which they have never accounted for.
9th. That the plaintiff, contrary to instructions, and the
ordinary and usual way of doing such business, placed in the
hands of applicants for insurance, a great number of policies,
without receiving from them the premiums of insurance at
the time of the delivery to them of these policies.
These are the grounds of complaint which the defendant
claims existed against the plaintiffsat the time when the removal
of the plaintiffs from their agexLey was made-that removal,
however, being made with the consent of the plaintiffs them-
selves. They further, in their answer, state certain counter-
claims, or claims existing in favor of the defendant, and against
the plaintiffs, growing out of the same transactions, or connected
with them-out of which grows the claim of the plaintiffs. The
first counter-claim is for three thousand dollars, money col-
lected by plaintiffs for defendant, while plaintiffs were acting
as general agents for defendant, and which they have niot paid
over to the defendant. The second counter-claim is for two
thousand dollars damages for unfaithfulness of plaintiffs, as
previously stated in the answer (being the same unfaithfulness
which I have spoken of), and by reason of false representations
of the plaintiffs, that the defendant was an unreliable and insol-
vent company, these false representations being made for the
purpose of persuading, and by which persons holding insurances
in the company of the defendant were persuaded to drop those
insurances, and insure in the Connecticut Mutual Life Insur-
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ance Company. The third counter-claim is for the amount of
five notes, given by the plaintiffs to the deiendant, for fifty dol-
lars each, payable as stated in the answer, with interest from
the several dates, copies of which, as you will see, are contained
in the answer. On all counter-claims the defendant claims to
recover the amount of five thousand three hundred dollars
with interest from the several dates stated in the answer.
There is an additional counter-claim-a claim made by the
defendant, which is a counter-claim, although not styled as
such in the answer. This claim is for certain policies of insur-
ance which were by the defendant put into the hands of the
plaintiffs, and which had not been accounted for by the plain-
tiffs to the defendant, and which it asks that the plaintiffs
may be compelled to account for in this action.
The reply of the plaintiffs to the answer of the defendant
denies the several statements contained in the answer; puts in
issue, perhaps, all the statements which are made material
except the statement of the counter-claims. It does not deny,
entirely, the first counter-claim of three thousand dollars for
money alleged to be in the hands of the plaintiffs, belonging to
the defendant. It admits a liability on that counter-claim to
the extent of about six hundred dollars, and denies any liability
on that counter-claim, to an amount beyond that sum. What
I have denominated the third counter-claim, that is the claim
upon the five promissory notes, is not at all denied by the
reply, and whatever is not denied of those counter-claims by
the reply, is admitted, unless there is substantially a statement
in the petition, which is in contradiction of the statements of
the counter-claim. The reply does not deny the second counter-
claim at all. That counter-claim I have already said to you
is for damages, which the defendant says it has sustained by
reason of the want of fidelity of the plaintiffs, in the discharge
of their duties as general agents of the defendants, and by
reason of certain false representations that were made in re-
spect to the solvency and responsibility of the defendant's com-
pany, by which persons were persuaded to change insurances
which they had previously effected in the defendant's company,
into the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company. There
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is, however, the statement in the petition, which to some ex-
tent is a denial of the statements contained in this counter-
claim, that the plaintiffs were faithful in the discharge of their
duties. So much of the counter-claim, to which I have re-
ferred, as avers a want of fidelity in the plaintiffs, is substan.
tially a denial of the statement in the petition, of fidelity on
the part of the plaintiffs.
The object of this action is not to recover damages for any
improper or unauthorized .removal of the plaintiffs, by the
defendant, from their agency, nor is any such fact alleged in
the petition, but its object is to recover the value to the plain.
tiffs, of their commissions on renewals of policies effected by
them, for the defendant, on the ground that the defendant
refused to allow them to collect these renewals and receive
their commissions upon them.
There is nothing in this contract which required the plaintiffs
to continue in this agency any longer than they pleased to con.
tinue; or the defendant to continue them init any longer than
it pleased to continue them. The plaintiffs might, therefore,
abandon the agency at any time, and at any time the defendant
might discharge them from it, subject, however, to any rights
or liabilities which might exist in favor of, or against either,
at the time of such abandonment or discharge. Nor is there
anything in the contract which would prevent the defendant
appointing other general agents in the State of Ohio. There
is no restriction in it of the defendant's powers in this respect,
or any grant of the exclusive right of the plaintiffs to the
agency of the whole State.
From the character and subject-matter of this contract,
and the nature of the relations which it created between the
parties to it, it is manifest that entire good faith should be
required of the parties in the execution of it.
The defendant had the right to prescribe the terms and
conditions of the appointment of its agents, and rules for
thcir government in the discharge of the duties of their agency,
and an acceptance of the agency was an acceptance of such
terms, conditions and rules, and both parties are bound to
their observance in good faith.
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Now while the defendant might appoint other general agents
in the State, not being restricted by the contract in that respect,
yet good faith on the part of the defendant would require that
it should not appoint other general agents to occupy ground
previously occupied by the plaintiffs, and so materially and
injuriously interfere with the interests of the plaintiffs under
the contract. But the mere appointment of another general
agent to operate in territory previously occupied by the plain-
tiffs, would not injure the plaintiffs, so as to furnish grounds of
complaint to them, or be a breach by defendant of its part of
the contract, unless and until such agent had so acted under
his appointment and within such territory as t6 deprive the
plaintiffs of, or materially or substantially lessen the benefits,
advantages and profits of the plaintiffs under their contract.
If the plaintiffs procured insurance in the defendant's com-
pany as general agents, as it is conceded they did, by so doing
they would become entitled to commissions on the first pre.
miums, and would, prima face, acquire the right to commis-
sions on the premiums on the renewals of those policies, so
long as they should be collected by the plaintiffs, or paid to the
defendant without other or further expense to the defendant
than plaintiffs' commissions. And if the plaintiffs were at all
times ready and williag to collect such renewal premiums with-
out such other or further expense to the defendant, and the
defendant refused without any good cause to permit them to
collect, and withheld from them the necessary means and fa-
cilities for collecting such premiums, the plaintiffs would be
entitled to recover from the defendant the value of their
commissions on such premiums, whatever you may, from the
testimony, find to be that value.
To enable the plaintiffs to recover, then, there must have
been-
1. Insurance effected by the plaintiffs in the company of
the defendant on which there were renewals.
2. Readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiffs
to collect those renewals without further or other expense to
the defendant than their commissions for such collection.
3. Refusal by the defendant, without good cause, to allow
the plaintiffs, to collect these renewal premiums.
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That there were insurances effected by the plaintiffs on which
there were renewals, seems to be undisputed. Were the plain-
tiffs at all times willing and ready to collect these renewals
wishout further expense to the defendant than their commis-
sions? *The plaintiffs claim that they have proven they were.
The defendant claims to have-roven that they were not; that
so long as the plaintiffs were ready and willing to collect these
renewals, it sent them the renewals for that purpose, and they
did collect them and received their commissions on 'them; and
this was the case with all the renewals prior to the renewals of
September, 1867; and before these renewals were to be collected
the plaintiffs abandoned their agency, and by reason of such
abandonment of their agency, from that time they were not
willing and ready to collect these renewals, and the defendant
was not, after that time, bound to furnish them with the re-
newals for collection.
If the plaintiffs, without good cause, furnished them by the
defendant therefor, voluntarily abandoned the entire agency,
the agency, so far as the collection of renewals was concerned,
as well as the agency so far as the procuring of new insurances
was concerned, then the plaintiffs, from the time of suchaban-
donment, were not ready and willing to collect these renewals,
and the defendant was not bound to furnish them to the plain
tifi for that purpose, and the plaintiffs cannot recover that
which they. claim in this action. But the voluntary abandon-
ment by the plaintiffs of the agency so far as related to the
procurement of new insurances, would authorize and justify the
defendant in removing them from the agency for collecting the
renewals. But if the defendant did not-I mean after said
voluntary abandonment of a part of the agency (that part
which related to the effecting insurance)--did not so remove
the plaintiffs for such cause-their abandonment of that part
of the agency which related to the procurement of new insu-
rances-and the plaintiffs still continued, with the defendant's
assent, to collect the renewals, they being still ready and willing
to collect them, such an abandonment of a part of the agency
would not be a forfeiture of their right to collect the renewals,
and would not, of itself prevent their recovery in this action.
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And it is upon this ground precisely that the agent may, with
the consent of his principal, abandon a part of the duties which
pertain to him to perform by virtue of his contract of agency;
and may, with the assent of his principal, continue to perform
all other duties pertaining to his agency. But if the agent says
to the principal, "I will not perform a part of these duties, I
will only go on and perform another part of them," that will
afford good ground for the principal to discharge the agent
from the performance of any duties, as such, for if it would
not, the agent might of himself, of his own motion, of his own
mere will, change the contract between the parties, into a con-
tract of a different character from that which they intended to
make, and did make, but if the principal assents io the agent
continuing as agent for the performance of part of the duties,
then the principal cannot, after such assent, claim the aban-
donment by the agent of the performance of a part of the du-
ties, as a defense to any claim which the agent may make, for
the performance of so much of the duties, as, with the assent
of the principal, he did perform.
Did the defendant, without good cause, refuse to allow the
plaintiffs to collect these renewals? That is what is averred
in the petition, and upon that subject, of course, there is a
denial in the answer.
The plaintiffs assert that they faithfully performed the duties
of their agency. The defendant says they did not, and in its
answer sets out many particulars in which it claims they were
unfaithful to the defendant, as their general agents, and which
they say furnished good cause to the defendant for terminating
the plaintiffs' agency, and withdrawi-Ag the renewals from them
and for which it was in fact terminated, and the renewals with-
drawn from them, and with the consent of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs were bound, undoubtedly, in good faith to exe-
cute and discharge the duties of the agency, in substantial
conformity with its terms and conditions, and the instructions,
which were a part of the contract, except so far as they were
changed or waived with the assent of the defendant.
Now whatever may have been the original terms and condi-
tions of this contract, it was entirely competent for the parties
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to the contract at any time to change or waive a performance
in conformity with its terms and conditions. A failure in this
respect, on the part of the plaintiffs, in the performance of their
duties in good faith; gross misconduct in them, and gross
neglect of duty would be gross misconduct, would be a forfeiture
of the plaintiffs' right under the contract, and would justify the
defendant in removing the plaintiffs from their agency, and
withholding from them the renewals for collection. The plain-
tiffs were not necessarily bound to devote their whole time and
attention to the business of their agency, nor were they bound
not to accept the agency of any other business, the discharge
of the duties of which would not essentially or materially inter-
fere with the business of the defendant, or conflict with its
interests. Good faith, however, required of them while acting
as the general agents of the defendant, that they sh6uld devote
Eso much of their time and attention as was reasonably neces.
sary to a faithful discharge of their duties. They had no
right to neglect its interests to the injury of the defendantmor
bad they a right to take the agency of any other business
which would necessarily come in conflict with, and the execu-
tion of which did in fact, come in conflict with and injuriously
affect, the interests of the defendant. The selection as medical
examiners of persons known by the plaintiffs as unfit and
unsuitable persons for the performance of those'duties; the
unwarrantable and unjustifiable refusal and neglect to make
returns and remittances, and to account for policies and renewal
certificates; the endeavoring to persuade and the persuading
of persons who had taken policies in the defendant's company
to give up those policies and take policies in other companies;
the keeping of false books of account, or keeping their accounts
purposely in such a manner as to deceive the defendant, or
prevent its knowing the true condition of the business in their
hands; the knowingly making of false represefitations as to
the solvency or ability of the defendant, or as to any other
* matters prejudicial to the business or interests of the defendant;
the unjustifiable retaining in their hands money of the defendant
which they ought to have paid over to it; each and all of these'
acts, if done by the defendants, and especially if done with the
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intent and purpose of injuring the defendant, would be invio
lation of their duty, and would be such misconduct in the
plaintiffs as would justify the defendant, unless the defendant
assented to or 'vaived them after the commission of them, to
dismiss the plaintiffs from their agency, and withdraw from
them the collectiQn of the renewals, and would be a forfeiture
of the plaintiffs' right to the collection of the renewals and
their commissions on such collections.
If the plaintiffs did not, voluntarily, abandon their agency,
as I have before stated, in the manner and under the circum-
stances I have already stated to the jury, and the defendant
did not have good cause for its refusal to allow the plaintiffs to
collect the renewals, and did refuse to allow them to collect the
renewals, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the value of
their commissions on such renewals after such refusal.
But if the plaintiffs did so voluntarily abandon their agency,
or the defendant did have good cause for its refusal to allow
them to collect these renewals, then the plaintiffs cannot
recover.
Now upon the facts of this case, gentlemen, I have nothing
to say, as those facts ate for your disposition alone. I have
stated to you what I suppose to be the rules of law properly
applicable to what are claimed to be the facts in the case, by the
parties to this action. If the plaintiffs are entitled to recover,
they are entitled to the value of their commissions on the
renewals of insurance effected by them in defendant's company.
It is the value of the plaintiffs' commissions on these renewals
which is to be recovered, and you are to get at their value as
best you can, upon the testimony in the case. It is, from the
nature of the plaintiffs' claim, somewhat difficult to estimate
correctly this value. This value depends so much upon contin-
gencies, that to some extent it must be conjectural. The ter-
mination of the life of the insured, or his refusal or neglect to
continue his insurance, would put an end to the renewals, and
when either of these will happen is beyond human knowledge.
But insurance companies have some rules by which these events
are approximately ascertained, and base the estimates of value
upon these rules. But whatever may be the rules upon which
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* these estimates are based, if you can find from the testimony
in this case, what was the actual value of the plaintiffs' commis-
sions upon these renewals, you should return that value, irre-
spective of any estimates based upon these rules, and you may
resort to the estimates based upon these rules where the other
testimony fails, or in aid of the entire testimony; giving to
such estimates, and all the testimony in the case, such weight
and influence as you think it ought reasonably to have.
If you find for the plaintiffs on their claim, you will ascertain
the damages by computing the proper interest upon them from
the time when their claim should have been paid to the first
day of the present term of this court: and then you will pro-
ceed to the ascertainment of what is due from the plaintiffs
to the defendant upon the claims asserted in its answer; and
this, however, you are required to do, whether you find for
or against the plaintiffs on their claim.
I have said to you that the first counter-claim of the defend-
ant is for three thousand dollars, money collected by the plain-
tiff while acting as the agents of the company, which was not
paid over to the defendant. This counter-claim embraces money
only. You will ascertain how much money is due on this coun-
ter-claim. The plaintiffs admit, as they say, about six hundred
dollars due from the plaintiffs to the defendant on this contract.
The admission does not bind anybody but the plaintiffs. They
have no effect or influence upon .this claim of the plaintiffs
beyond this: that to the extent to which it is admitted there
is money due upon this claim by these plaintiffs to the defend-
ant, to that extent you must return a verdict in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiffs; but the whole claim beyond
that is open to the testimony to prove, and you are to find from
all the testimony in the case, if you can, how much money there
was, at the time of the commencement of this suit, in the hands
of these plaintiffs belongingto this defendant. Forthat amount,
whatever it be, the defendant should be allowed a verdict
against the plaintiffs, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a
verdict for their claims against the defendant or not.
The third counter-claim, I haye said to you, is founded upon
five promissory notes, about which there is no controversy. As
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this is a just claim in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiffs, you are to compute the interest upon these notea
according to the. terms of the notes, if they provide when the
interest shall commence, and if they do not provide when the
interest shall be payable upon them, you are to compute the
interest from the day when those notes became due.
The second counter-claim is for damages due to the defend-
ant by reason of the unfaithfulness of the plaintiffs in the dis-
charge of their'duties in the agency of the defendant, and by
reason of their false representations made for the purpose of;
and which did, 'in fact, induce persons holding insurances
in defendant's company to drop those insurances and take
new insurances in the Connecticut Mutual
To allow anything on the first branch of this counter-claim,
you must find that the plaintiffs were unfaithful in the discharge
at their duties as agents of the defendant, and that some damage
resulted, directly and immediately, to the defendant therefrom.
The proof should show some specific damage, and that the
unfaithfulness of the plaintiffs produced it-that is, you must
be able to put your hand or finger upon some feature, in which
the defendant has sustained damage by reason of the want of
fidelity in the discharge of their duties, and whatever that
damage may be should be allowed to the defendant.
To allow damages on the second branch of this counter-claim
you must find that false representations were made, and that
they had the effect of persuading, and did persuade persons to
drop their insurance in the defendant's company and take
insurances in the Connecticut Mutual, and whatever was the
value to the defendant, of insurances so lost to the defendant,
may be allowed to the defendant as damages. The defendant,
however, should be aile to satisfy you that they so lost in-
surances and what was the value of- the insurances so lost by
them. They should be able specifically to show you that the
persons would have continued their insurances in the defend-
aut's company, had it not been for these representations made
by the plaintiffs to them.
There is still another claim made, as I have told you, by the
defendant in its answer, not called a counter-claim, but which
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i., in fact, a counter-claim in its nature. This claim is for poli.
cies and notes in the hands of the plaintiffs not accounted for,
a list of which you will find appended to the defendant's
answer, and which the defendant asks that the plaintiffs in
this case may be compelled to account for.
Under and by virtue of one of the articles of instructions,
policies and notes sent by the defendant to plaintiffs were to
be charged to plaintiffs and to be accounted for by them to
the company. This provision of the articles of instructions
gave defendant the right to charge to plaintiffs the policies
and notes which were sent to them-that is, as I understand it,
the first premiums on those policies and the amount of the notes.
If the policies or notes, or any of them contained in.this list,
were sent to the plaintiffs, they would properly stand charged
with them, and to relieve themselves from the charge, the plain-
tiffs must show that they have accounted for those policies and
those notes, either by returning them to the defendant unpaid
(the notes unpaid, of course), before or at this trial, or in some
other manner, orshow, so far as the policies are concerned that
they never were delivered and never took effect as contracts of
insurance. Unless they so account for them, the jury should
charge the plaintiffs with them. You will ascertain, then, what
is due from the plaintiffs on these claims, asserted by the defen-
dant against the plaintift in its answer, computing the proper
interest on whatever you shall find to be due, to the first day
of the present term of this court. Should you find in favor of
theplaintiffs in their claim (and in consequence of a part of the
claim of the defendant not being denied by the reply, you must
necessarily find in favor of the defendants on some of these coun-
ter-claims), you will strike a balance between the claims of the
parties, and return a verdict in favor of the party in whose favor
you find the balance to be, for the amount of that balance. If,
however, you should find nothing due the plaintiffs upon their
olaim, you will nevertheless return a verdict in favor of the
defendant for the amount of its claim, as you shall find it to be
against the plaintiffs.
The jury returned a verdict in behalf of the insurance com-
pany, and against the plaintiffs, for $1,958 23.
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DENSMORE OIL CO. v. DENSMORE ET AL.
The owners of any property my form an association or partnership with
others, and may sell their property to the company at any price agreed on,
provided there be no fraudulent representations made by them, and no such
confidentiai relation arises, as to make them liable to account for any prolit
realized on such sale.
But where persons have formed an association, or are dealing in contem.
ptation of one, then they stand in confidential relation to each other and to
all who may subsequently become members, and they caniiot purchase any
property and sell it to the company at an advance without a full disclosure of
all the facts. Ifthey do so the company may compel them to account for tho
profit.
An oil company was formed upon property belonging to some of the defend.
ants: the valuation of the property was represented by stock to a certain
amount, and part of this stock was given by the defendants who had owned
the laud to the other defendants who became the active parties in getting up
the company. Held (no misrepresentation being proved), that neither class of
the defendants were liable to other subscribers to the stock of the company.
APPEAL from the Court of Nisi Prius. In Equity.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHAISWOOD, J.-There are two principles applicable to all
partnerships or associations for a common purpose of trade or
business, which appear* to be well settled on reason and
authority.
The first is, that any man or number of men, who are the
owners of any kind of property, real or personal, may form a
partnership or association with others, and sell that propertyto
.the association atany price which maybe agreed upon between
them, no matter what it may have originally cost, provided
there be no fraudulent misrepresentation made by the vendors
to their associates. They are not bound to disclose the profit
which they may realize by the transaction. They are in no
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sense agents or trustees in the original purchase, and it follows
that there is no confidential relation between the parties which
affects them with any trust. It is like any other case of vendor
and vendee. They deal at arms' lelagth. Their partners are in
no better position than strangers. They must exercise their
own judgment as to the value of what they buy. As it is
succinctly and well stated in Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 489:
"A party may have a clear right to say, I begin the trans-
action at this time. I have purchased land, no matter how or
from whom, or at what price. I am willing to sell it at a cer-
tain price for a certain purpose." This principle was recognized
and applied by this court in the recent case of HcElhenny's
Administrators v. The Hubert Oil Co., decided May 11, 1869,
Legal Intelligencer of 1869, p. 181: "It nowhere appears,"
said the present chief justice, "that McElhenny, the purchaser
from Hubert, the original owner, did it as the agent of Messrs.
Baird, Boyd & Co. and others, though he bought it to sell again,
no doubt; he had a perfect right, therefore, to deal with them
at arms' length, as it seems he did." And again: "If the pro-
perty was not purchased by MeElhenny for the use, and as agent
for the company, but for his own use, he might sell it at a profit,
most assuredly. No subsequent purchasers from his vendees
wcnld have any right to call upon him to account for the profits
made on his sale." In that case, McElhenny, being the owner
of property which cost him only $4,000, sold it to Baird, Boyd
& Co. and others who associated with him to form an oil com-
pany, for $12,000, and it was decided that the company could
not call him in equity to account for the profit he had made.
The second principle is, that where persons form such an asso-
ciation, or begin or start the project of one, from that time they
stand in a confidential relation to each other, and to all others
who may subsequently become members or subscribers, and it
is not competent for any of them to purchase property for the
purposes of such a company, and then sell it at an advance
without a full disclosure of the facts. They must account to the
company for the profit, because it legitimately is theirs. It is
a familiar principle of the law of partnership, one partner can-
not buy and sell to the partnership at a profit; nor if a partner-
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ship is in contemplation merely, can he purchase with a view to
a future sale, without accounting for the profit. Within the
scope of the partnership business each associate is the general
agent of the others, and he cannot divest himself of that charac-
ter without their knowledge and consent. This is the principle
of ifichen. v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562; Fawcett v. Whitehouse,
1 Russ. & M. 132, and the other cases which have been relied
on by the appellants. It was recognized in cElhenny's
Administrators v. The Hubert Oil Co., just cited; and also in
Simons v. The V.ulcan Oil Co., decided by this court May 11,
1869, Legal Intelligencer of 1869, p. 832 Both of these cases
were complicated with evidence of actual misrepresentations as
to the original cost of the property to the vendors. In the
opinion of the court in the last case delivered by THOMPSON,
C. J., it is said: "If the defendants in fact acted as the agents
of the companyin acquiring the property, theycouldnot charge
a profit as against their principal. Nor was their position any
better if they assumed so to act without precedent authority,
if their doings were accepted as the acts of agents by the asso.
ciation or company. If, in order to get up a company, they
represented themselves as having acted for an association to be
formed, and proposed to sell at the same prices they paid, and
their purchases were taken on these representations, and stock-
holders invested in a reliance upon them, it would be a fraud on
the company, and all those interested, to allow them to retain
the large profits paid them by the company in ignorance of the
true sums actually advanced." The defendants in that case
were subscribers, with others, to the stock ofa projected oil
company; and after it had been formed, secured to themselves,
by contract, the refusal of the property which they afterward
sold to the company at a greatly advanced price.
The question now presented is, under which of these two prin-
ciples is the present case to be classified. That willdepend upon
thefacts, which, though the testimony is somewhat voluminous,
maybe briefly stated. Densmore, Roudebush and Canfield, three
of the defendants, were the owners of certain lands, leases and
rights in Venango county, in the oil region. They had acquired
them, so far as appears, with no idea of disposing of them or of
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forming a company, but had spent over $100,000 jn improving
and developing them while they were owners. In March, 1864
they came to Philadelphia to ascertain whether they could be
sold to advantage. They caled upon Mr. Lawrence, another
of the defendants, and consulted him as to the beat mode of
effecting this object. They stated that they were willing to
accept $202,000, provided that sum could be procured clear
of all expenses. That seemed impossible, "unless by naming
a price so much beyond that sum as would cover all such
probable expenses and contingencies. The only mode by
which so large an amount could be realized was by the or-
ganization of a stock company, and to do that effectively,
persons must be employed as agents to sell or solicit subscrip-
tion to the stock; and they must be gentlemen of character
and influence, well acquainted with the subject, who could
bring the land to the notice of those desirous of engaging in
such an enterprise. The amount to be raised was large; the
result uncertain. Several agents must be employed, and their
compensation must be at a liberal rate. It was arranged that
the price should be fixed at $250,000; that the stock should be
50,000 shares at $10 a share, and $5 to be paid in cash. Mr.
Densmore and his associates agreed to take $122,500 in money,
and the balance in stock, and that from this stock they would
compensate the agents for their services. Mr. Densmore, who
was examined as a witness on behalf of the appellants, testified:
"The $122,500 was the proceeds of the sale of 24,500 shares.
That added to the 16,000 shares we were to get, amounted to
40,500 shares. The arrangement, as I understood it, was
that Messrs. Lawrence, Hugel, Watson, and perhaps parties
unknown to me, were to receive the balance of the stock for
their services in forming the company and disposing of the
stock" The gentlemen named were accordingly engaged fer
this purpose. They proceeded and did sell the 24,500 shares
in order to make the cash payment. There was no subscrip-
tion paper. Mr. Lawrence and his associates did not subscribe
for any stock. They did not appear, and were not held out as
subscribers to those who made purchases fromthem. It is true.
that after the company was organized the stock which they were
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tW receive from Dexsmore, Roudebush and Canfield as a com-
pensation for their services, was issued to them directly-not
to the vendors, and by them transferred. But this was done
by a special order, as is satisfaciorily explained in the testi-
mony of K B. Schneider: "I heard Mr. Densmore request
Mr. Lawrence to have the Densmore stock, which he (Mr.
Lawrene), Watson, Hugel aiid Whitney were entitled to,
issued direct to themselves, as he might not be here when the
certificates would be ready." It has not been, and cannot be
controverted, that the stock which they received was part of
that which, undei the original terms of the sale, Densmore,
Roudebush and Canfield were to have in payment of the
purchase-money.
Now it can hardly be questioned, and, indeed, apart from
their alleged liability as confederates with the other defend.
ants, it has not been questioned, that Densmore, Roudebush
and Canfield fall within the first principle hereinbefore stated.
They had, for a considerable time, been the owners of the pro-
perty, had acquired it with no reference to the formation of this
or any other company, and had improved and developed it by
a very large outlay of their own capital. They had a clear and
undoubted right to put their own price upon it in the formation
of a company, in which they were to be partners or associates.
They did put upon it the price of $250,000, which, itis admitted,
at the rates at which such property was then selling in the
market, was a fair and reasonable, nay, even a low price.
"From my knowledge of mining properties in the oil region at
that time," says N. B. Brown, Esq., in his testimony, "and
especially of the leasehold and other interests conveyed to this
eompany, Iregarded their interests at the price named,$250,000,
as cheaper than any that were offered in this market. Their
actual productive value was very great; the leases were on what
was regarded as the best territory on Oil Creek." Had Messrs.
Densmore, Roudebush and Canfield employed no agent, but
sold all the stock themselves, the transaction as to them could
not have been impeached. They certainly stood in no confi-
dential relation to the subscribers or purchasers of the stock in
the fturi, -when they acquired the property. This is neces.
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sary, as we have seen. A company or partnership must have
been then formed or forming, or at least the project must have
been started, in order that any confidential relation should arise.
How, then, is their position varied by the fact that they em-
ployed agents and agreed to compensate these agents by a
transfer of a certain part of the stock they were to receive? It
is not easy to see. The whole $250,000, money and stock.
when received, was their own absolute property: they could
give or transfer it to whomsoever they pleased. f, as we
have seen, they stood in no confidential relation to the com-
pany, no trust could attach to the price or any part of it in
their hands. We may dismiss, therefore, the case of Messrs.
Densmore, Roudebush and Canfield, as clearly within the
first principle to which we have before adverted.
But what confidential relation did 'the other defendants sus-
tain to the purchasers of the stock or to the company? It is a
clear and unquestionable fact in the cause, that they did not
subscribe for a single share. Their contract was with Dens-
more, Roudebush and Canfield, to receive from them a part of
their stock. Without an order from them, Mr. Lawrence and
the others could not have compelled the company to issue any
of it to them. If Densmore, Roudebush and Canfield had re-
ceived all the certificates to which they were entitled, and
then refused to transfer, the only remedy of Messrs. Lawrence
and others would have been against them to recover damages
for violation of their contract. It is clearly proved that the
paper among the exhibits headed "Subscription List to the
Densmore Oil Co.," was made out by Mr. Lawrence after the
organization, as a list of those fo whom certificates of stock
were to be issued. The names of Lawrence, Whitney, Wat-
son and Hugel appear on that list, but clearly only as appoin-
tees or assignees of Densmore, Roudebush and Canfield. The
same appointment or order might have been given by them
to mere strangers.
It is strenuously contended, however, thatif these defendants
did not stand in a confidential relation to the purchasers of
stock, then 'there was nobody who stood in that relation.
But is there anything extraordinary in that? Nine-tenths of
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the transactions and contracts of life are at arms length. If a
man buys stock in the market of a broker, there is nobody who
stands in any fiduciary relation to him. He acts on his own
judgment. He is bound to pay the broker the price agreed, and
the broker is bound, when paid, to deliver him the stock. This
was the only relation in which Lawrence, Whitney, Hugel and
Watson stood to those who bought stock from them, and who,
according to all the testimony in the cause, so understood it.
'They supposed,.as they state, that these gentlemen were to
receive compensation for their services. What it was to be
they did not inquire, because it was none of their business.
A strong effort, however, has been made to show that these
defendants (Lawrence, Whitney, Watson and Hugel) were pur-
chasers from Densmore, Roudebush and Canfield, of an interest
in the property, and sold it at an advance. But of this there
is not a spark of evidence. It can hardly be pretended that
Densmore, Roudebush and Canfield couldhave held them liable
on a contract to purchase any interest in the land, or that' the
agents could in any event have sued them for not conveying to
them such interest. If this was so, how can it be contended
,that they were vendors of any part of the property to the com-
pany?
Densmore, Roudebush and Canfield were first and last the
only vendors. They executed the deed, and very properly
receipted for the whole of the purchase-money, for they were
entitled to the whole of it. Nor is the fact that Lawrence,
Whitney, Watson and Hugel, joined with Densmore, Roude.
bush and Canfield, as original corporators, and signed the ar-
ticles for the organization of the company, under the Act of
July 18th, 1863 (Pamph. L., 1864, p. 1102),a fact of any signifi-
cancy. That act does not require that the corporators should
be subscribers to stock. They need have no interest whatever
in the company to be formed. They are mere instruments of
the law for purposes of preliminary organization. The moment
that is accomplished, the amount required as capital paid in,
the necessary certificate signed, and the charter granted, they
are functi offico. The corporation is thenceforth composed of
the stockholders.
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It is supposed that the cases of icfElnny's Administrators
v. i'e Hubert Oil Co. and Simmons v. lhe Fulcan Oil Co.,
before referred to, ought to rule this cause. But an examina-
tion of the opinions in those cases will show that the facts upon
which they were decided were entirely different from those
which appear on this record. The defendants there were sub-
scribers to the stock ; they became purchasers of the property
after the project of a company was started, and, moreover,
falsely represented that they had purchased it at the same price
at which they sold.
These facts, which were the grounds uponwhichthose deter.
minations were based, are not, as we have seen, the facts of this
case. It is not pretended that any false representation was
made by any of these defendants in the sale of the stock.
Some other points have been raised, which are, however suf-
ficiently disposed of in the opinion below.
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the
appellants.
District Court of the City of Philadelhia.
COX V. THE FARMERS' MARKET COMPANY.
The owner of property is not liable to a trespasser, or one who comes on
It by mere sufferance, for negligence, even though the act complained of would
be a nuisance in a public highway.
It is the duty of every person to take care of his own safety, and one who
ventures along a private passage-way at night, does so at his own risk.
Between two market-houses there was a space of thirty feet wide runn
from one street to another. The space was paved both as a foot and cart-way,
and formed an open passage-way from street to street, which the public were
In the habit of using, though both it and the market-houses were private pro.
perty. Held, that the passage-way was not a public highway.
The purpose of the company in leaving open and paving the space being
plainly to accommodate customers resorting to the market-houses, its acquies.
uence in the general use of the passage-way by the public was not a dedication
to public use.
A person going along this passage-way at night, after market hours, fell
down the steps of a basement opening on the passage-way. Held, that the
company were not liable for his injuries.
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The plaintiff sued in case, claiming damages for injury
received from falling down a flight of steps -leading into an
apartment, under the market-house, designed for a restaurant.
There are two large market-houses on the north side of Mar.
ket street, between Eleventh and Twefth streets. The eastern
one is the property of the defendants. The two houses are
separated by a space of thirty feet in width, leading from Mar-
ket to Filbert street. This space is used for the convenience of
persons who attend the markets as buyers and sellers. The
whole of the space constitutes a _passage between Market and
Filbert streets. About four feet wide, on each side of this pas-
sage, is paved with brick to a curb of stone, having posts set
at intervals throughout the entire distance between these
streets. The rest of the passage is paved with flag-stones,
and is connected with Market street by a railway running
northwardly about one hundred feet. This railway is used
for bringing produce to the two markets.
The restaurant is situated about forty feet north of Market
street, and borders on the thirty feet wide passage. It is
guarded by strong iron railing, except at the entrance or door-
way to the steps down which plaintiff fell. On the evening
of September 27,1868, the plaintiff, in company with two others,
came out of the market-house, intending to go to some place of
amusement. They had crossed the passage when the plaintiff,
saying he had some business up the passage, left his compan-
ions. After an absence of five minutes he returned to them,
holding his hand on his mouth, and said something about his
watch and his hat. He then conducted his companions to the
entrance to the flight of steps spoken of leading to the restau-
rant. One of his companions testified that he groped his way
down some ten or twelve steps, and there found the plaintiff's
watch and hat. The place was quite dark; there was no lamp
there.
The declaration set forth that the defendants were the pos-
sessors and occupiers of a certain messuage near a certain com-
mon and public highway; that the plaintiff was passing in and
along said highway, and then and there unavoidably fell into
a hole or area opening into a. certain basement, etc.
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The plaintiff's evidence having been received, a non-suit was
ordered, and this was a motion to take it off:
STROUD, J.-The plaintiff; although he might have been a
witness, did not offer himself for that purpose, and there is not,,
in fact, any direct evidence as to the place at which he fell.
But there is no difficulty made as to this defect. The broad
question is, whether, on the facts, there is any responsibility, on
the part of the defendants, for the injury suffered by the plain-
tiff ? Can the thirty feet wide passage be regarded as apubli&
highway, as it is laid to be in the declaration? If it belonged
to the market company, and the area into which the plaintiff
fell was on the property of the defendants, the plaintiff can
recover nothing. The evidence shows it to be private property,
property of the defendants. It was brought and devoted entirely
to the use of the company. The railway indicates that it was
specially intended for market purposes. The railway does not
run from Market to Filbert street, but stops at the distance of
one hundred feet from its entrance on Market street.
The plaintiff's counsel has referred to several decisions of
different courts, as sustaining his position, that the passage in
question falls within the description of a public highway. The
only one of these which bears upon the point is Bush v. ohn-
ston, 23 P.S.R. 209. It was there held that where the public
for above thirty years had been permitted to occupy, as a side-
walk, a portion of ground, in a village, in front of a private
building, the owner might be considered to have dedicated the
sidewalks to the use of the public.
There is no reason to find fault with this decision. But what
resemblance is there in it to the present case? There is a case,
Gowen v. The Exchange Company, 5 W. & S. 141, which does
resemble and decide it as respects the public highway. Gowen
v. The Exchange Company was tried before me, many years
ago, and the course pursued by me then was adopted in the
present action. The plaintiff's evidence was received, and a
non-suit then ordered. The Supreme Court refused to take off
the non-suit. The unanimous opinion of the court was deliv.
ered by Chief Justice GIBSON. It appears by the report, that
the plot of ground bounded by Dock, Walnut and Third streets,
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with the exception of a triangular lot on which stood a house
belonging ,to the plaintiff, was purchased by the Exchange
Company, who erected a large building upon it. The front of
the Exchange building, on Dock street, was thrown back, and
spaces of their lot in front were left, which were paved with
flag-stones and used by passengers for footways. One of these
wasbetween the plaintiff's house and the Exchange building,
and led to the post-office, which fronted on Dock street and
this pavement. After the erection of the Exchange the plain.
tiff improved his estern front and placed a door there. After-
ward -the Exchange Co mpany built a wall which closed up this
door, and was carried as high as the cornice of the plaintiffs
house.
The plaintiff brought suit, contending that, the paved spaces
and passages were dedicated to public use as a highway, and
that he had, therefore, a right of passage along them into and
from his house.
In the course of the opinion, the Chief Justice alluded to the
Masonic Hall on Chestnut street (in which the Supreme Court'
happened to be then sitting), saying "its apartments are let for
balls, concerts, lectures, auctions, exhibitions, and other pur-
poses, which require that it be a place of public resort to make
it profitable. In front of it is a quadrangular court thle breadth
of the building, and of the depth of forty-five feet, with a semi-
circular carriage-way from the street to the principal entrance
and out again; the rest of the space is paved,,and the whole is
used by passengers as a part of the public footway. Yet no
one imagines that the proprietors might not put a stop to the
public use by putting a building in front."
There are numerous other places in this city which are largely
in use by the public with carriages and horses and men on foot,
yet no one supposes that this permission by the proprietors
makes them liable for a local occurrence there in which they
have had no special agency. The landing at the foot of Walnut
street wharf, on the Delaware river, belonging to the 'Camden
and Amboy Railway Company, is a place of this description.
The Eastern Market Company, on.Fifth street, may be cited as
following within a similar description.
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Gillis v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 8 Am. Law
Reg., N. S. 729, furnishes a strong authority for the defend.
ants in the case in hand. The platform of the railroad com.
pany at Johnstown, having given way under an immense pres-
sure of persons drawn there for the purpose of seeing the Presi.
dent, who was in the cars, it was held that .the company were
not liable for damages for bodily injuries sustained by such
persons from its fall. Judge SnARswooD begins the opinion of
the court: "The platform of a railway company, at its station
or stopping place, is in no sense a public highway." Several
decisions of the English courts are referred to in this opinion.
It is not necessary to repeat them. The note to this case, by
one of the editors of the American Law Register, gives several
English cases which furnish a valuable illustration of the law
on the general subject. These need not be more particularly
noticed. There is, however, a case of recent date in England,
which meets the argument of the counsel of the plaintiff urged
before us, that the thirty feet passage between the market-
houses might, from the nature of its use, be properly denomi-
nated a public highway.
The case arose in this manner: By statute I and2 of W. IV.,
"every carriage, with two or more wheels, standing or plying
for hire in any public street or road, at any place within five
miles from the General Post Office in London, shall be deemed
to be a hackney carriage." And other statutes require a hack-
ney carriage-driver, unless he have a reasonable excuse, to
drive to any place not more than six miles from the place
where he is hired, to which the hirer may order him to drive,
and a penalty is imposed on him for his refusal.. In Case v
Storey, Law Reports, 4 Exch. 399, it appeared that the appellant
went to the Great Northern Railway station, within which, in
a rank of cabs by the side of the arrival platform was the re-
spondent's cab. The respondent had been admitted into the
station with his cab by the railway company, for the purpose
of accommodating passengers arriving by their trains. The
station is the private property of the company.
The appellant, who had not, on the occasion in question, been
a passenger on any train, required the respondent, whom he
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found standing on the arrival platform near the cab, to drive
him to Camden Town (a place less than six miles off), but upon
learning that the appellant had not arrived by train the respon-
dent declined to drive him. This was the offense complained of.
On the part of the appellant, it was contended that the re-
spondent was bound to drive him, and on refusing made him-
self liable to the penalty of the statutes. On the other hand,
the respondent urged that the Great Northern Railway station
wasprivateproperty, and that he and other cabmen who entered
the station to take passengers, were either hired by the com-
pany, or, at all events, were on private ground, under the com-
pany's license, and not in any street or place within the meaning
of the statute. A magistrate, before whom the respondent had
been summoned, was of opinion with the respondent, and dis-
missed the summons. There was an appeal from the magis-
trate's judgment. The question for the court, on this appeal,
was, whether the decision was right? The Court of Exchequer
sustained the'decision of the magistrate. KELLY, C. B., said,
in the course of his opinion : "It is clear to me that railway
stations are not either public streets or public roads. They are
private property, and although, it is true, they are places of
public resort, that does not, of itself, make them public places.
The public only resort there upon railway business, and the
railway company might exclude them at any moment they
liked, except when a train was actually arriving or departing
For the purpose of carrying on their business they must neces-
sarily open their premises, which are nevertheless private, and
in no manner capable of being described as public streets or
roads."
The plaintiff offered no explanation of his purpose in going
on the defendant's premises. The night was dark and the
market hours over. In such a state of things it was great rash-
ness to venture as he did. It was at his own risk. In Welcer-
son v. Fairlie, 1 Hurlstone & Coltman 633, a carman was sent
by his employer to the defendant's warehouse to fetch some
goods. He was directed by a servant of the defendant to go
along a passage to a counting-house, where he would find the
garehouseman. The passage was dark, and in going along it
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he fell down a staircase and was much hurt. The plaintiff was
nn-suited, the judge being of opinion, if he could see his way,
the accident was the result of his own negligence; if he could
not see his way he ought not to have proceeded without a light.
The Court of Exchequer held that the defendants were not
responsible, inasmuch as- there was no obligation on them to
]h' ht the passage or fence the staircase. In general it is the
duty of every person to take care of his own safety, and not
to walk along a dark passage without a light to disclose to
him any danger.
This decision supplements the only view of the facts shown
by the evidence which were not disposed of by Gowen v. The
Exchange Company, Gillis v. The Railway, and Case v. Storey.
Motion dismissed.
Supreme Court of the United States.
SAMUEL B. PAUL V. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.
Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the Constitution of the
United States, though the courts of the United States, for the purpose of sus-
taining jurisdiction, have conclusively presumed that a corporation chartered
by a State is composed of citizens of that State.
The privileges intended by the provision of the Constitution, declaring that
citizens of each State shall he entitled to all the privileges of citizens in the
several States, are those which are commonto the citizens of the several States,
under their Constitutions and laws, by virtue of their being citizens. Special
privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own State are not secured in other States
by it.
A law of Virginia, compelling corporations chartered by other States to give
security and procure a license before doing business in Virginia, is constitu-
tional, not be!% in violation of the clause giving citizens of each State the
privileges of citizens of the several States, nor of the clause giving Congress
power to regulate commerce.
The issuing of a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce, even
ihough the parties be domiciled in different States; it is a simple contract of
indemnity against loss.
In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State
of Virginia.
l.u PAUL v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.
The opinion of thecourt was delivered by
FIE;D, J.-An Act of the Legislature of Virginia, passed on
the 3d of February, 1866, provides that no insurance company,
not incorporated under the laws of the State, shall carry on its
business within the State without previously obtaining a license
for that purpose, and that it shall not receive such license until
it has deposited with the treasurer of the State, bonds of a speci-
fied character to an amount varying from thirty to fifty thousand
dollars, according to the extent of the capital employed.
A subsequent act, passed during the same month, declares
that no person shall, "without a license authorized by law, act
as agent for bny foreign insurance company," under a penalty
of not less than fifty dollars nor exceeding five hundred for
each offense, and that every person offering to issue, or making
any contract or policy of insurance for any company created or
incorporated elsewhere than in the State, shall be regarded as
an agent of a foreign insurance company.
In May, 1866, the defendant, a resident of the State of Vir-
ginia, was appointed the agent of several insurance companies
incorporated in the State of New York to carry on the general
business of insurance against fire, and in pursuance of the law
of Virginia he filed with the huditor of public accounts of the
State his authority from the companies to act as their agent.
He then applied to the proper officer of the district for a license
to act as such agent within the State, offering at the time to
comply with all the requirements of the statute respecting for-
eign insurance companies, including a tender of the license tax,
excepting the provisions requiring a deposit of bonds with the
treasurer of the State, and the production to the officer of the
treasurer's receipt. With these provisions neither he nor the
companies represented by him complied, and on that ground
alone the license was refused. Notwithstanding this refusal
the defendant undertook to act in the State as agent for the
New York companies without any license, and offered to issue
policies of insurance in their behalf, and in one instance did
issue a policy in their name to a citizen of Virginia. For this
violation of the statute he was indicted and convicted in the
Circuit Court of the city of Petersburg, and was sentenced to
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pay a fine of fifty dollars. On error to the Supreme Court of
Appeals this judgment was affirmed, and the case is brought
to this court under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.
The corporators of the severalinsurance companies were at
the time, and still are, citizens of New York, or of some one of
the States of the Union other than Virginia. And the business
of insurance was then, and still is, a lawful business in Virginia,
and might then, and still may, be carried on by all resident
citizens of the State, and by insurance companies incorporated
by the State, without a deposit of bonds, or a deposit of any
kind with any officer of the commonwealth.
On the trial in the court below the validity of the discrimi-
nating provisions of the statute of Virginia between her own
corporations and corporations of other States was assailed. It
was contended that the statute in this particular was in conflict
with that clause of the Constitution which declares that "the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States," and the clause
which declares that Congress shall have power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States."
The same grounds are urged in this court for the reversal of
the judgment.
The answer which readily occurs to the objection founded
upon the first clause consists in the fact that corporations are
not citizens within its meaning. The term citizens, as there
used, applies only to natural persons, members of the body
politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons
created by the legislature, and possessing only the attributes
whichthe legislature has prescribed. It is true that it has
been held that where contracts or rights of property are to be
enforced by or against corporations, the courts of the United
States will, for the purpose of maintaining jurisdiction, consider
the corporation as representing citizens of the State under the
laws of which it is created, and to this extent will treat a cor-
poration as a citizen within the clause of the Constitution extend-
ing the judicial power of the United States to controversies
between citizens of different States. In the early cases, when
this question of the rights of corporations to litigate in the
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courts of the United States was considered, it was held thatthe
right depended upon the citizenship of the members of the cor.
poration, and its proper averment in the pleadings. Thus, in
the case of lhe Hope Insurance Company v. Boardman, 5
Cranch 57, where the company was described in the declaration
as "a company legally incorporated by the legislature of the
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, and estab-
lished at Providence," the judgment was reversed because there
was no averment that the members of the corporation were
citizens of Rhode Island, the court holding that an aggregate
corporation as such was not a citizen within the meaning of
the Constitution.
In later cases this ruling was modified, and it was held that
the members of a corporation would be presumed to be citizens
of the State in which the corporation was created, and where
alone it had any legal existence, which any special averment of
such citizenship, the averment of the place of creation and busi-
ness of the corporation being sufficient, and that such presump.
tion could not be controverted for the purpose of defeating
the jurisdiction of the court: Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson, 2
How. 497; MAarshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 16
How. 314; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How.
233; and Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 1
Black 297.
But in no case which has come under our observation, either
in the State or Federal courts, has a corporation been considered
a citizen within the meaning of that provision of the Constitu-
tion, which declares that the citizens of each State shall be enti-
tled to allthe privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
States. In Bank of Augusta v. Earle 13 Peters 686, the
question arose whether a bank incorporated by the laws of
Georgia, with a power, among other things, to purchase bills of
exchange, could lawfully exercise that power in the State of
Alabama; and it was contended as in the case at bar, that a
corporation composed of citizens of other States was entitled to
the benefit of that provision, and that the court should look
beyond the act of incorporation and see who were its members
for the purpose of affording them its protection, if found to be
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citizens of other States, referencebeing made to"a early decision
upon the right of corporations to litigate in the Federal courts
in Support of the position. But the court, after expressing
approval of the decision referred to (Bank of the UnitedStes
v. Deveaz, 5 Cranch 61), observed that the decision was con-
fined in express terms to a question of jurisdiction; that the'
principle had never been carried further, and that it had never
been supposed to extend to contracts made by a corporation,
especially in another sovereignty from that of its creation; that
if the principle were held to embrace contracts, and the mem-
bers of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals carry-
ing on business in the corporate name, and therefore entitled
to the privileges of citizens, they must at the same time take
upon themselves the liabilities of citizens, and be bound by
their contracts in like manner; that the result would be to make
the corporation a mere partnership in business, with the in-
dividual liability of each stockholder for all the debts of the
corporation; that the clause of the Constitution could. never
have intended to give citizens of each State the privilges of
citizens in the several States, and at the same time to exenlipt
them from the liabilities attendant upon the exercise of such
privileges in those States; that this would be to give the citti-
zens of other States higher and greater privileges than are
enjoyed by citizens of the State itself, and would deprive each
State of all control over the extent of corporate franchises proper
to be granted therein. "It is impossible," continued the court,
"upon any sound principle, to give such a construction to the
article in question. Whenever a corporation makes a con-
tract it is the contract of the legal entity, the artificial being
created by the charter, and not the contract of the individual
members. The only rights it can claim are the rights which
are given to it in that character, and not the rights which be-
long to its members of citizens as a State."
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to
place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citi-
zens of other States so far as the advantages resulting from
citizenship in those States are concerned. .It relieves them
from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibit&
VoL. XVIII.-8.
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discriminating legislation against them by other States; it
gives them the right of free ingress into other States and egress
from them; it ensures to them in other States the same free-
dom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition
and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness;
and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of
their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the
Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens
of the United States one people as this: Lemmo v. Peopk, 20
N. Y. 607. Indeed, without some provision of the kind re-
moving from citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage
in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege
with citizens of those States, the republic would have con.
stituted little more than a league of States; it would not have
constituted the Union which now exists.
But the privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each
Statein the several States by the provision in question are those
privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in
the latter States under their Constitution and laws by virtue of
their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in
their own States are not secured in other States by this pro-
vision. It was not intended by the .provision to give to the
laws of one State any operation in other States. They can
have no such operation except by the permission, express or
implied, of those States. The special privileges which they
confer must, therefore, be enjoyed at home, unless the assent
of other States to their enjoyment therein be given.
Now, a grant of corporate existence is a grant of special pri
vileges to the corporators, enabling them to act for certain
designated purposes as a singleindividual, and exempting them
(unless otherwise specially provided) from individual liability.
The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have
no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where
created. As said by this court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
"It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate
to another sovereignty." The recognition of its existence even
by other States, and the enforcement of its contracts made
therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States-a
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comity which is never extended where the existence of the
corporation or the exercise of its powers are prejudicial to
their interest or repugnant to their policy. Having no
absolute right of recognition in other States, but depend-
ing for such recognition and the enforcement of its contracts
upon their assent, it follows, as a matter of course, that
such assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions
as those States may think proper to impose. They may
exclude the foreign corporation entirely, they may restrict its
business to particular localities, or they may exact such security
for the performance of its contracts with th eir citizens as in
their judgment will best promote the public interest. The
whole matter rests in their discretion.
. If on the other hand, the provision of the Constitution could
be construed to secure to citizens of each State in other States
the peculiar privileges conferred by their laws, an extra terri-
torial operation would be given to local legislation utterly
destructive of theindependence and the harmony of the States.
At the present day corporations are multiplied to an almost
indefinite extent. There is scarcely a business pursued requir-
ing the expenditure of large capital, or the union of large num-
bers, that is not carried on by corporations. It is not too much
to say that the wealth and business of the country are to a
great extent controlled by them. And if, when composed of
citizens of one State, their corporate powers and franchises could
be exercised in other States without restriction, it is easy to see
that, with the advantages thus possessed, the most important
business of those States would soon pass into their hands. The
principal business of every State would, in fact, be controlled
by corporations created by other States.
If the right asserted of the foreign corporation, when com-
posed of citizens of one State, to transact business in other
States were even restricted to such business as corporations of
those States were authorized to transact, it would still follow
that those States would be unable to limit the number of cor-
porations doing business therein. They could not charter a
company for any purpose, however restricted,, without at once
opening the door to a flood of corporations from other States to
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engage in the sane pursuits. They could not repel an intrud
ing corporation except on the condition of refusing incorporation
for a similar purpose to their own citizens; andyet it might be
of the highest public interest that the number of corporations
in the State should be limited; thAt they shouldbe required to
give publicity to their transactions; to submit their affairs to
proper examination; to be subject to forfeiture of their corpor-
ate rights in case of mismanagement, and that their officers
should be held to a strict accountability for the manner in
which the business of the corporation is managed and be liable
to summary removal.
"It is impossible," to repeat the language of this court in
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, "upon any sound principle, to give
such a construction to the article in question,"-a construction
which would lead to results like these.
We proceed to the second objection urged to the validity of
the Virginia statute, which is founded upon the commercial
clause of the Constitution. It is undoubtedly true, as stated by
counsel, that the power conferred upon Congress to regulate
commerce includes as well commerce carried on by corporations
as commerce carried on by individuals. At the time of the
formation of the Constitution a large part of the commerce of
the world was carried on by corporations. The East India
Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, the Hamburgh Com-
pany, the Levant Company and the Virginia Company may be
named among the many corporations then in existence which
acquired, from the extent of their operations, celebrity through-
out the commercial world. This state of facts forbids the sup.
position that it was intended in the grant of power to Congress
to exclude from its control the commerce of corporations. The
language of the grant makes no reference to the instrumen.
talities by which commerce may be carried on; it is general,
and includes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships, as-
sociations and corporations.
There is, therefore, nothing in the fact that the insurance
companies of New York are corporations to impair the force
of the argument of counsel. The defect of the argument lies in
the character of their business. Issuing a policy of insurance
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is not a transaction of commerce. The policies are simple con.
tracts of indemnity against loss by fire entered into between
the corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by
the latter. These contracts are not articles of commerce in any
proper meaning of the word. They are not subjects of trade
and barter offered in the market as something having an exist-
ence and value independent of the parties to them. They are
not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one State to
another, and then put up for sale. They are like other per-
sonal contracts between parties which are completed by their
signature and the transfer of the consideration. Such con-
tracts are not interstate transactions, though the parties may
be domiciled in different States.. The policies do not take
effect-are not executed contracts-until delivered by the
agent in Virginia. They are, then, local transactions, and are
governed by the local law. Theydo not constitute a part of the
commerce between the States any more than a contract for the
purchase and sale of goods in Virginia by a citizen of New York
whilst in Virginia would constitute a portion of such commerce.
In Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73, this court held that a
law of that State imposing a tax on money and exchange
brokers, who dealt entirely in the purchase and sale of foreign
bills of exchange, was not in conflict with the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate commerce. The individual thus
using his money and credit, said the court, "is not engaged in
commerce, but in supplyingan instrument of commerce. He is
less connected with it than the ship-builder, without whose
labor foreign commerce could not be carried on." And the
opinion shows that, although instruments of commerce, they
are the subjects of State regulation, and, inferentially, that
they may be the subjects of direct State taxation.
"In determining," said the court, "on the nature and effect
of a contract, we look to the Lex loci where it was made, or
where it was to be performed. And bills of exchange, foreign
or domestic, constitute, it would seem, no exception to this ru:e.
Some of the States have adopted the law merchant, others have
not. The time within which a demand must be made on a bill,
a protest entered, and notice given, and the damages to be
